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ABSTRACT
The attraction of wealthy suburbs rests, in part, on their political and fiscal autonomy from the low-income
electorate and poor tax base in many central cities. I estimate the willingness to pay to live in an affluent
suburb by measuring changes in housing prices on opposite sides of city-suburban borders as the income
gap between the city and suburb widens (or narrows) over time. I find that a $10,000 increase in town-level
median income is associated with a seven percent increase in housing values. The demand for high-income
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Over the past century, American households left central cities en masse to settle in the 
suburbs. The share of metropolitan residents living in the central city fell from 60 percent in 
1940 to 32 percent in 2000. At the same time, the income differentiation between cities and 
suburbs widened dramatically. Whereas, in 1940, the typical suburban resident earned only three 
percent more than his urban counterpart, the city-suburban income gap increased to 16 percent 
by the year 2000. The concentration of affluent households in the suburbs creates disparities in 
the bundle of local public goods and property tax rates between cities and suburbs, providing a 
further impetus toward suburbanization.
1  
This  paper  examine  the  demand  for  residence  in  high-income  suburbs  –  above  and 
beyond the demand for affluent neighbors – by comparing the prices of adjacent housing units on 
either side of city borders.
2 In particular, I estimate panel regressions that examine how the city-
suburban housing price gap changes as income disparities between cities and suburbs widen (or 
narrow)  over  time.  This  specification  controls  for  long-standing  differences  in  housing  and 
neighborhood quality across borders that can arise if, for example, municipal zoning ordinances 
generate  discontinuous  shifts  in  housing  characteristics  at  the  border  or  if  households  with 
different attributes sort across borders according to their preferences for public goods. 
I focus on the years 1960 through 1980, a peak era of suburbanization in the United 
States.  In  this  period,  the  marginal  homeowner  was  willing  to  pay  7.4  percent  more  for  an 
                                                 
1  Suburbanization  was  also  driven  by  the  falling  time  cost  of  commuting  associated  with  the  diffusion  of  the 
automobile and large state and federal road building programs (LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Baum-Snow, 2007; 
Kopecky and Suen, 2009) and by rising crime rates and increasing racial diversity in central cities (Cullen and 
Levitt, 1998; Boustan, 2010). 
2 Other recent  work using housing  values to estimate  household preferences  for neighborhood and community 
attributes include Black (1999); Kane, Staiger and Samms (2003); Barrow and Rouse (2004); Figlio and Lucas 
(2004); Chay and Greenstone (2005); Reback (2005); Greenstone and Gallagher (2008); Gibbons, Machin and Silva 
(2009),  Machin  and  Salvanes  (2010),  and  Boustan  (Forthcoming).  This  literature  draws  on  the  theoretical 
contributions of Rosen (1974).      
     
 
2 
otherwise equivalent housing unit located in a town whose median income was $10,000 higher 
than that of the neighboring city (in 2000 dollars). I then seek to explain the demand for living in 
a high-income town using a series of fiscal and expenditure variables. I find that the demand for 
living  in  a  wealthy  town  stems  from  two  main  factors:  lower  property  tax  rates  set  by 
jurisdictions with a larger tax base and higher school quality, despite equal expenditures per 
pupil, in wealthier districts.
3 Taken together, these two factors can explain half of the estimated 
willingness to pay to live in an affluent town. 
The  identifying  assumption  in  the  panel  analysis  is  that,  whatever  the  initial  gap  in 
housing or neighborhood quality across jurisdiction borders, the direction and pace of change 
over time in these attributes is common to both sides of the border. Although one can never 
definitively rule out differential trends in unobserved quality, I present three pieces of evidence 
that mitigate against this possibility. First, there are no differential trends in observable housing 
quality measures, such as unit size, over time. Secondly, the effect of town-level median income 
on  housing  prices  is  equally  strong  in  a  series  of  subsamples  which  are  less  likely  to  have 
experienced differential changes in neighborhood composition or local land use policy. Thirdly, 
housing prices do not respond to town-level median income in a parallel sample of southern 
cities that shared a school district with their neighboring suburbs and  offered limited voting 
rights to poor residents during this period. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  introduces  the 
estimation methods used to relate housing prices to a jurisdiction’s median income or poverty 
rate. Section  III  describes the unique data set  of Census blocks along municipal borders.  In 
Section IV, I present the relationship between jurisdiction-level income and housing prices and 
                                                 
3 Because direct measures of school quality, such as test scores, do not exist during this period, I proxy for school 
quality with the share of residents holding a college degree.      
     
 
3 
test the maintained assumption that housing quality changes at the same rate across borders. 
Section V explores the local governmental channels that give rise to the willingness to pay for 
wealthy co-residents. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Using Housing Prices to Elicit the Demand for Wealthy Co-Residents 
 A. An Econometric Framework 
The goal of this paper is to estimate the marginal homeowner’s willingness to pay to live 
in an affluent town, controlling for housing quality and neighborhood composition. This section 
describes cross-section and panel estimation strategies that can be used to elicit this parameter. 
Potential biases in the cross-section motivate the panel analysis. 
To begin, consider pooling data from the 1960 to 1980 cross-sections and estimating:   
   
ln(PRICEijbt) = β INCOMEjt + Φ′(block)it + Ψ′dbt + εijbt            (1) 
 
where i indexes Census blocks, j jurisdictions, b border areas, and t Census years. A border area 
consists of a pair of jurisdictions, one of which is a city and the other a suburb. PRICE represents 
one of three block-level dependent variables: the mean value of owner-occupied units, the mean 
rent for rental units, and combined measure of the user cost of housing. The key explanatory 
variable, INCOME, is either the median income or the poverty rate of a jurisdiction’s residents. 
Some specifications also add available block-level housing and neighborhood quality controls 
(blockit). Regressions are weighted by the number of relevant housing units on the block and 
standard errors are clustered by border area. 
Equation 1 contains a separate indicator variable for each border area b in Census year t 
(dbt). This vector captures unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are shared by houses on      
     
 
4 
either side of a border at a point in time – for example, the presence of a nearby park, bus line, or  
commercial  strip  –  and  for  common  aspects  of  the  housing  stock,  such  as  the  age  and 
architectural  style  of  the  units.  The  effect  of  town-level  income  is  identified  by  comparing 
housing prices in the two jurisdictions that constitute a border area. A positive β implies that 
houses located in wealthier towns command systematically higher prices than their cross-border 
neighbors. 
In  the  cross-section,  β  will  be  biased  upward  if  high-income  towns  impose  zoning 
regulations that improve the quality of the housing stock or if better quality neighbors sort across 
the border into the wealthy town. After all, the cross-section captures long-standing differences 
between cities and suburbs; by 1970, many of the borders in the sample had been in place for 
over 100 years. However, both land use policies and residential sorting patterns evolve slowly 
over time. Therefore, it is less plausible that fluctuations in housing prices are driven by changes 
in zoning rules or in the characteristics of local neighbors.  
Equation 2 exploits the panel nature of the dataset to estimate the relationship between 
decadal changes in housing prices and in town-level median income: 
 
ln(PRICEijbt) =  β INCOMEjt + Φ′blockit + Ψ′dbt + Ω′dbj + εijbt               (2) 
           
In addition to the variables in equation 1, this specification includes a distinct fixed effect for 
each side of a border area, expressed as an interaction between border area b and jurisdiction j 
(dbj). This vector absorbs any fixed difference in housing or neighborhood quality across borders 
– for example, due to long-standing differences in school quality or local zoning ordinances 
between the two jurisdictions. β is now identified from differential changes in housing prices 
across the border over time.      
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The  generalizability  of  the  willingness  to  pay  figures  estimated  at  municipal  borders 
depends on whether residents of border areas reflect the preferences of other city and suburban 
residents. Suburban households living near the border chose to be closer to the city center than 
other suburban residents, suggesting that they place a lower value on being physically separated 
from the low-income city population. However, it is not clear how attitudes toward immediate 
neighbors are correlated with preferences for local public goods. If suburbanites on the border 
also have weaker preferences for the suburban bundle of public goods, the coefficients may 
underestimate the true willingness to pay for living in an affluent suburb. 
 
B. Predictions from Jurisdiction Choice Models 
Various classes of jurisdiction choice models predict that housing prices will rise with the 
income level of a town’s residents, thereby generating a gap in housing prices at the border of 
rich and poor towns. One set of models begins with the observation that the rich are more willing 
than the poor to trade off a dollar of private consumption for a dollar of public expenditure (see, 
for  example,  Tiebout,  1956;  Ellickson,  1971;  Westhoff,  1977;  Epple  and  Romer,  1991; 
Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996). These models generate equilibria in which individuals self-
select  into  towns  populated  by  others  of  the  same  income  level.
4  Epple  and  Sieg  (1999) 
incorporate  housing  markets  into  a  framework  in  which  multiple  communities  fund  locally-
provided  public  goods  through  property  taxation.
5  They  prove  that,  in  this  context,  housing 
                                                 
4 Epple and Platt (1998) consider a model in which individuals differ along two dimensions: income and preferences 
for public goods. In this case, sorting need not happen only along income lines but, instead, a poor household with 
strong preferences for public goods may select to live in a “rich” community. 
5 Calabrese, Epple, Romer and Sieg (2006) extend this model to consider the role of peer effects. In their framework, 
the quality of local public good are produced by some combination of local expenditures and higher peer quality. In 
this case, higher quality peers allow richer towns to achieve a given quality of public goods with a lower tax rate. I 
find evidence consistent with this model in Table 5, which shows that rich towns have lower property tax rates than 
poor towns and yet have equal per-pupil educational expenditures and higher school quality.      
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prices will be higher in rich areas and will serve as an effective means of stratification because 
the poor will not want to settle in rich towns at the equilibrium price.
6 
An  alternative  class  of  jurisdiction  choice  models  focus  on  the  property  tax  system 
(Buchanan and Goetz, 1972; Hamilton, 1976). Rich towns have a larger tax base and so are able 
to afford an equivalent bundle of public goods at a lower tax rate. These models give rise to a 
“poor chasing the rich” equilibrium in which agents of all income levels prefer living in a town 
with wealthier co-residents.
7 The fiscal subsidy offered in rich towns will be capitalized into 
housing prices, again generating a price gap at town borders.  
   
III. Collecting Housing Prices Along Jurisdictional Borders 
My empirical strategy combines block-level data on housing values from the US Census 
of Housing with municipality-level information on socio-economic status and local public goods 
from  the  Censuses  of  Population  and  Governments.  Detailed  data  on  local  government 
expenditures and property tax rates are only available for jurisdictions with 10,000 residents or 
more. For the subset of towns of this size, I use tract- and block-level Census maps to identify 
city-suburban borders along which block-level data is reported on both sides. I exclude borders 
that are entirely obstructed by features like a railroad track, a body of water or a large tract of 
industrial land.
8  
                                                 
6 Epple and Sieg (1999) assume that the housing supply is less-than-perfectly elastic. Without this assumption, the 
housing supply in rich towns would simply expand until housing prices equal construction costs. During this period, 
suburban housing supply was expanding but new construction occurred in outlying areas. Given commuting costs, 
outlying houses are imperfect substitutes for housing on the border. Essentially, we should think of the supply of 
houses at city-suburban borders as fixed during this period. 
7  Henderson  (1985),  Wheaton  (1993)  and  others  point  out  that  zoning  regulations  can  prevent  the  poor  from 
successfully chasing the rich. 
8 The fitness of each border is determined by examining Census block maps. In particular, I subdivide border areas 
into series of tract pairs consisting of one tract on either side of the border. A border is only excluded if all tract pairs 
along the border is obstructed in some way. I recorded the reason for each pair exclusion in a border selection      
     
 
7 
Ruling out obstructed borders improves the plausibility of the identifying assumption. 
However, it also raises the question of endogenous border formation. Municipalities can erect 
bulwarks  against  unwanted  populations  by  zoning  for  industrial  use  along  their  borders  or 
constructing large roadways with limited ability for pedestrian crossing. Cicero, IL is (in)famous 
for its ethnic and racial exclusivity (Keating, 1988). It may be no coincidence, then, that the 
Chicago/Cicero border is obstructed by industrial land. As a result, border selection will favor 
jurisdictions  that  are  the least hostile  to  the  city  population,  thus  working  against  finding  a 
housing price effect at the border. 
I identify 56 borders in 16 metropolitan areas with block-level data in 1960, at which 
point the Census Bureau only assigned blocks to central cities and a few large suburban areas.
9 
In 1970 and 1980, I expand the sample to 102 borders in 31 metropolitan areas.
10 Table 1 lists 
the metropolitan areas that contribute borders to the sample. The balanced panel (column 1) 
over-represents large, fragmented cities with populous suburbs. Los Angeles-Orange County and 
New York City-Northern New Jersey account for nearly 50 percent of the sample. The expanded 
sample incorporates more geographic diversity, adding smaller college towns like Madison, WI 
and growing western cities like Las Vegas, NV (column 2). The total number of sample borders 
from each metropolitan area are listed in column 3, while column 4 lists the number of borders in 
each area that was excluded due to the presence of an obstruction.  
                                                                                                                                                             
dataset that is available upon request. Reasons for pair exclusions include features like cemeteries, golf courses, 
ponds, park land and highways. 
9 To increase the 1960 sample, I include 15 borders that divide two suburbs (e.g., Cambridge-Somerville, MA). 
10 The number of borders in the sample is small relative to the total number of divisions in urban areas. I identified 
925 jurisdiction borders in the 16 metropolitan areas that contribute to the panel sample, over 700 of which divided 
two suburbs. Of the 168 city-suburban borders in these metropolitan areas, 107 included a suburb with 10,000 or 
more residents and 78 were clear of any obvious obstruction. These 78 borders are included in the sample (56 in the 
panel sample and 22 from the expanded sample). The average central city in these metropolitan areas bordered on 
10.5 suburbs.      
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I exclude southern borders from the main analysis for two reasons. First, nearly half of 
the southern poor were African-American, a group that lacked a secure right to vote until at least 
1965. Therefore, the median income of a town’s residents is not a good measure of the median 
income of the local electorate in the South. Secondly, many southern school districts cover an 
entire county, including both the central city and its suburban neighbors. As a result, we would 
not expect to find a relationship between town-level income and housing prices at southern 
borders through the channel of local tax rates or local public goods. However, if the housing 
price effect instead reflect confounding factors, like variation in land use policy across town 
boundaries, we may find similar (spurious) effects in the South. I conduct this placebo exercise 
using a parallel sample of 49 southern borders in Table 5. 
For each sample border, I collect block-level data on the first six blocks away from the 
border in each direction. Because Census blocks are not digitally mapped for this period, I code 
the distance of each block from the border by hand. Block data must also be entered by hand for 
1960 but are available electronically in 1970 and 1980.
11 The available block-level variables 
include mean housing values for owner-occupied units, mean rents for rental units, and a small 
number of housing quality measures.
12 Due to confidentiality concerns, housing prices or rents 
are only published for blocks containing five or more owner-occupied or rental units. I create a 
measure of the average “user cost” of housing that can be calculated for all blocks in the sample. 
The user cost is a weighted average of the annual rent paid by renters and the annual borrowing 
cost paid by homeowners (borrowing cost = home value x interest rate).
13 Available housing 
                                                 
11 Many Ohio counties are unaccountably missing from the 1970 electronic block data. I limit coverage of Ohio to 
borders in the panel sample or borders for which electronic data is available in 1970 and 1980. 
12 The housing values in the Census are based on owner self-reports, which were validated in Kain and Quigley 
(1972). An important benefit of the Census, compared to transaction data, is that it covers the full housing stock, 
rather than selected units that have been put up for sale.  
13 I use an interest rate of 8 percent for this calculation, which was the average contract mortgage interest rate over 
the 1960-80 period. Historical mortgage rates are available at http://mortgage-x.com/trends.htm.      
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quality controls include the number of units on the block, the average number of rooms by tenure 
status, the share of units that are in single family structures and the share of residents on the 
block who are black.
14  
Blocks are matched to the socio-economic characteristics of the jurisdiction in which they 
are located, including the median income and poverty rate of town residents. I also compile data 
on property tax rates and municipal expenditures by category. The effective property tax rate is 
defined as a unit’s property tax bill as a share of its market value (rather than as a share of its 
assessed value). Systematic data on effective property tax rates, drawn from a special survey of 
recent  home  sales  conducted  by  the  Census  of  Governments,  were  only  collected  in  1970. 
Because test score data is unavailable during this period, I proxy for school quality with the share 
of residents holding a college degree. More detail about the sources for the local policy measures 
is provided in Appendix Table 1.  
Appendix Tables 2 and 3 present means and standard deviations of the jurisdiction-level 
and block-level variables, respectively. In 1970, median family income in sample jurisdictions is 
$50,000 and the average difference in median family income across a sample border is $10,000 
(in  2000  dollars).  There  is  substantial  variation  in  local  policy  across  borders.  Crossing  the 
typical border into the central city results in a 0.7 percentage point increase in property tax rates 
(measured  as  a  share  of  the  unit’s  market  value)  and  a  $500  increase  in  local  government 
expenditures per capita for non-educational purposes. 
Housing units in the border sample have attributes typically associated with the suburban 
housing stock. In 1970, 76 percent of the units on the average block were detached, single family 
dwellings. The typical housing unit had 5.7 rooms. Seven percent of residents on the average 
                                                 
14 The Census of Housing does publish a few other housing attributes at the tract level (for example, the age of the 
unit and the number of bedrooms and bathrooms). These characteristics are not reported in the block data.      
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block were black. However, this value is a weighted average of 25 borders with a high black 
population share (29.5 percent) and 77 borders with a low black population share (0.4 percent). I 
demonstrate below that the main results are not being driven by the 25 racially diverse borders. 
 
IV. Willingness to Pay for High-income Municipalities 
A. Graphical Evidence of Housing Price and Quality Gaps Across Borders and Over Time 
  I  begin  my  analysis  of  the  willingness  to  pay  for  town-level  income  with  graphical 
evidence  documenting  discontinuous  shifts  in  both  the  level  and  the  rate  of  appreciation  in 
housing prices across municipal borders. In the cross-section, I classify each jurisdiction pair into 
a richer and poorer town. In the panel, I instead classify jurisdictions into those with faster and 
slower income growth over the decade. Figures 1 and 2 present housing prices for the first six 
block tiers away from the border in either direction.
15 I designate blocks on the richer (faster 
growth) side of the border with positive numbers, while blocks on the poorer (slower growth) 
side are represented with negative numbers. 
  Figure 1a demonstrates that housing prices on the first block tier of the high-income 
jurisdiction (block 1) are five percent higher and statistically different from their cross-border 
neighbor (block -1). In contrast, housing prices on the first block tiers on either side of the border 
are statistically indistinguishable from adjacent blocks within the same jurisdiction (blocks 1 vs. 
2 or blocks -1 vs. -2). Figure 2a presents comparable evidence for the panel specification. There 
is a clear discontinuity in housing price appreciation at the border, with prices increasing by an 
                                                 
15 In particular, I graph coefficients from versions of equations 1 and 2 that replace town-level median income with 
dummy variables for block tiers coded by jurisdiction type (e.g., rich/poor) and distance from the municipal border.      
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additional four percent of housing value between blocks 1 and -1 over the decade. Housing price 
appreciation is otherwise identical on adjacent blocks within the same jurisdiction.
16 
Figures 1b and 2b assess the plausibility of the identifying assumption by examining 
shifts in unit size across municipal borders or changes in unit size across borders over time. In 
the cross-section, housing units are somewhat larger on the first block of a wealthy jurisdiction 
(block 1), with 0.1 additional rooms per unit compared to their cross-border neighbor (block -1). 
However, in the panel, there is no clear pattern of changes in unit size when crossing the border 
between jurisdictions with faster or slower income growth. As a result, my preferred results 
make use of the panel of border areas. 
   
B. Formal Tests for Differences in Housing Characteristics Across Borders and Over Time 
This section conducts formal tests of the identifying assumptions that the housing units 
on either side of city-suburban borders are of equal quality (in the cross-section) or experience 
the same magnitude of change over time (in the panel).  In particular, I estimate versions of 
equations 1 and 2 in which the set of housing and neighborhood quality characteristics serve as 
dependent variables. In each case, I begin with the full sample, which contains blocks up to six 
tiers  from  the  municipal  border  (roughly  equivalent  to  a  Census  tract),  and  then  restrict  the 
sample to blocks that are adjacent to the city-suburban border. 
The first two columns of Table 2 present coefficients from the cross-section. Census 
tracts located on the wealthier side of jurisdiction borders have more single family units, a larger 
number of rooms per unit and fewer black residents. When narrowing the comparison to the 
                                                 
16 For the cross-section, the p-values for the hypothesis that the first block tiers on either side of the border are equal 
is 0.00. In contrast, the p-values when comparing the first to the second block tier inside each jurisdiction (or the 
second to the third block tier) range from 0.35 to 0.85. For the panel, the p-value for the cross-border hypothesis is 
0.08 and the range for the tests within each jurisdiction is 0.42 to 0.82.      
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block level, most of these differences are cut in half and are no longer statistically significant. It 
is particularly relevant that there are no cross-border differences in the share of single-family 
units or in the density of development (housing units per block), two characteristics that are often 
the target of zoning laws. However, as is clear in Figure 1b, wealthy municipality have larger 
housing units even on the first block adjacent to the border. A $10,000 increase in town-level 
median income (20 percent) is associated with 0.15 additional rooms per unit.  
The third and fourth column of Table 2 contain equivalent coefficients for the panel 
specification. Two patterns are worth noting. First, none of the differences in the (change in) 
housing  quality  between  jurisdictions  with  different  rates  of  income  growth  are  large  or 
statistically significant. Second, the point estimate on unit size, the one measure of concern in the 
cross-section, falls to zero in the tract comparison and is cut in half at the block level. One 
remaining concern may be that jurisdictions with larger increases in median income experience 
less black in-migration over a decade. However, this pattern is driven entirely by a small subset 
of borders going through a racial transition. If I restrict the sample to the 77 borders with low 
initial black population shares, the relationship between town-level income and the probability of 
having  a  black  neighbor  disappears.  I  demonstrate  below  that  the  housing  price  results  are 
equally strong in this subsample (Section IV.D). 
 
C. Housing Price Gaps Across Jurisdiction Borders and Over Time 
I  turn  in  this  section  to  the  core  relationship  between  town-level  income  and  local 
housing prices. I start in Figure 3 with a graphical exercise relating changes in the suburban 
housing price premium to changes in the suburban-city income gap over the 1970s. The structure 
of Figure 3 is equivalent to the panel regression. In particular, the X-axis indicates a change in      
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the log income gap between a suburb and the neighboring city. Positive values indicate that 
suburban and city income diverged over the 1970s, while negative values indicate convergence. 
The Y-axis depicts changes in the suburban housing premium at each border.  
Figure 3a reveals a positive relationship between town-level median income and housing 
prices at the municipal border. A greater divergence of suburban income from the neighboring 
city is associated with a larger increase in the suburban housing premium. The slope of 0.55 
implies  that  a  $10,000  (or  20  percent)  increase  in  median  income,  the  typical  cross-border 
income gap, is associated with an 11 percent increase in housing prices. This pattern is not driven 
by any outliers. For comparison, Figure 3b examines the relationship between town-level median 
income and a measure of housing quality (the number of rooms in the average housing unit). The 
slope of this relationship is nearly flat. A 20 percent increase in median income is associated 
with the presence of 0.09 of an additional room. The exclusion of one outlier (Allentown-Easton, 
PA) cuts this relationship in half.  
Table 3 contains estimates of the relationship between housing prices and aspects of a 
town’s income distribution (median income and poverty rates). I begin with a discussion of the 
cross-sectional results contained in columns 1-3. In the full block sample, the coefficient implies 
that  a  $10,000  (or  20  percent)  increase  in  median  income  is  associated  with  an  8.5  percent 
increase in housing prices (= 0.43 · 0.2). When restricting the sample to blocks adjacent to the 
border, the implied effect falls to a 7.0 percent increase in housing prices. Adding the available 
housing  and  neighborhood  quality  controls  further  reduces  the  implied  effect  of  a  $10,000      
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increase in median income to 4.0 percent.
17 The large change in the point estimate with the 
addition of housing quality controls in the cross-section further motivates the panel analysis. 
Columns 4-6 report the panel results. If the cross-section merely reflected unobserved 
differences in housing quality, we would expect to find smaller panel coefficients. In contrast, 
each panel regression produces somewhat larger estimates than its cross-sectional counterpart. In 
the  block-level  comparison,  I  find  that  a  $10,000  increase  in  median  income  leads  to  a  9.6 
percent increase in housing prices. Adding block-level controls reduces the implied effect to 7.4 
percent.  Note  that  adding  block-level  controls  only  reduces  the  coefficient  of  interest  by  20 
percent in the panel regressions (compared to over 40 percent in the cross-section) and that the 
coefficients with and without block-level controls lie within each other’s 95 percent confidence 
interval. 
Panel B considers the willingness to pay to avoid living in a town with a high poverty 
rate.
18 Focusing on the most conservative estimates (those conducted at the block-level with 
controls for housing quality), I find a coefficient of -0.7 in both the cross-section and panel 
specifications.  The  coefficient  implies  that  a  five  percentage  point  increase  in  town-level 
poverty, roughly equivalent to the gap at the typical border, would lead to a 3.5 percent decline 
in  housing  prices.  In  comparison  to  the  median  income  results,  there  is  no  evidence  that 




                                                 
17 The three percentage point decline in the coefficient on median income can be explained by the difference in the 
number of rooms across borders and the value of an additional room (0.03 = 0.2 log point increase in housing value 
per room · 0.15 difference in number of rooms for a 20 percent increase in median income). 
18 The concept of an absolute “poverty line,” which takes into account family size and the ages of family members, 
was developed in the 1960s. Thus, the poverty rate regressions include only 1970 and 1980.      
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D.  Robustness to Alternative Specifications 
Table 4 considers a series of alternative specifications for the panel estimation. The first 
row reproduces the baseline specification, which weights each observation by the number of 
owner-occupied housing units on the block. This weighting scheme addresses the fact that the 
average housing price is calculated more accurately on blocks with a larger number of housing 
units but it also puts more weight on areas with higher density. The results are not qualitatively 
changed in rows 2 and 3, which instead weights each block or each border equally. Results are 
again unchanged in row 4, which limits the sample to the 56 borders in the balanced panel. 
Row 5 re-estimates equation 2 without the 23 California borders. California conducted a 
major school finance equalization in the 1970s, which may have reduced the willingness of its 
residents to pay to live in a high-income town or school district. Indeed, I find a somewhat larger 
value placed on town-level median income outside of California. In a similar fashion, Row 6 
drops  the  53  borders  for  which  at  least  one  jurisdiction  experienced  court-ordered  school 
desegregation  over  the  period.
19  The  estimated  response  to  town-level  median  income  is 
unchanged, suggesting that income is not simply proxying for the desire to avoid integrated 
schools. 
Rows 7 and 8 consider the rents and the user cost of housing as alternative measures of 
the willingness to pay for town-level income. Rental prices are not as responsive to town-level 
median income – compare the implied 6.2 percent increase in rents to the 9.6 percent increase in 
housing values for a $10,000 increase in median income. The weaker response may be due to the 
                                                 
19 I collect data on the presence of desegregation court-orders by school district from the State of Public School 
Integration website (Logan, 2004). The site contains the full text of judicial decisions and enumerates each action 
that a district was required to take to counteract desegregation. I classify any school district that was required by the 
court  to  engage  in  at  least  one  remedial  step  to  address  school  segregation  between  1960  and  1980  as  a 
“desegregated” district and drop any border for which at least one jurisdiction falls into this category. Boustan 
(2010) explores the effect of school desegregation on housing prices during this period in more detail.      
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composition of the rental market; renters tend to be younger, less well-off, and less likely to have 
children. In addition, unlike rents, housing prices might also incorporate expectations of future 
income divergence between a city and its suburbs. The presence of rent control in some urban 
areas may also limit the ability of the rental market to adjust through prices. Due to the Census 
Bureau’s data restrictions, only a subset of sample blocks have available data on average rental 
rates or housing values. Row 8 incorporates a measure of the user cost of housing, which allows 
the inclusion of all housing units along the border in all years. The implied effect of town-level 
median income on user costs is larger than on either housing values or rents alone.
20  
The coefficient in Row 9 is from a regression that, in addition to median income, includes 
two town-level characteristics on the right-hand side: black population share and the share of the 
population over 65 years of age. Others have found that racially fragmented cities and cities with 
a larger elderly population spend a smaller share of their budget on public goods (Alesina, Baqir 
and Easterly, 1999; Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauser, 1993). However, adding these town-level 
correlates has no effect on the relationship between median income and housing prices.  
 
E. Using Subsamples to Consider Alternative Hypotheses 
Thus far, I have documented that the demand for suburban residence increases as the 
income  gap  between  a  city  and  suburb  widens  over  time.  Due  to  the  panel  nature  of  the 
estimation, this relationship cannot be driven by long-standing differences in the housing stock 
or neighborhood composition of adjacent areas. However, it could reflect changes in local land 
use policy or neighborhood composition over the decade. Although this possibility can never be 
definitively ruled out, Table 5 documents that the estimated effect of town-level median income 
                                                 
20 Note that the coefficient on user costs is not itself a weighted average of the housing price and rental estimates 
because many blocks have both owner-occupied and rental housing.      
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on housing prices is just as strong in a series of subsamples in which such changes in zoning 
policy or neighborhood composition are less likely. 
Race is the one measure of neighborhood composition available at the block level. For a 
subset  of  25  racially  diverse  borders,  an  increase  in  town-level  median  income  is  indeed 
associated  with  a  relative  decline  in  the  probability  of  having  a  black  neighbor  over  time. 
However, there is no such relationship between changes in town-level income and local racial 
composition for the remaining 77 borders. If the estimated effect of town-level median income 
on housing prices simply reflected a willingness to pay to avoid black neighbors, we would 
expect the relationship to be muted in this racially homogenous subsample. In contrast, the effect 
of median income on housing prices is, if anything, a bit larger for this group (row 2).
21 
Although zoning regulations cannot be directly observed in the data, differences in local 
policy should be reflected in characteristics of the housing stock. In particular, towns with more 
stringent land use rules should have fewer multi-family units and higher housing prices than their 
cross-border neighbors. I use these two measures to classify border areas into those more and 
less likely to have been subject to different land use regimes. If the estimated effect of town-level 
income on housing prices is driven by differences in land use, we would expect to find weaker 
results on borders that start out with small initial differences in housing prices or in the share of 
single-family units. Rows 3 and 4 show that this is not the case. The estimated coefficients in 
these subsamples (0.45-0.46) are nearly identical to the full sample (0.43). 
  A parallel sample of southern border areas also cast doubt on the possibility that the 
estimates can be explained by differences in local land use policy. Southern municipalities had 
control  over  their  own  land  use.  If  the  relationship  between  changes  in  town-level  median 
                                                 
21 In order to include the full sample, I classify initial conditions in 1970 and estimate a panel regression with data 
from 1970 and 1980.      
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income and housing prices were due to changes in local zoning policy, we would expect to find 
effects of a similar magnitude in the South. However, if the housing price estimate instead driven 
by local public goods, the effect should be attenuated in the South because southern cities often 
shared a school district with their neighboring suburbs and limited the voting rights of poor 
(black) residents during this period. Row 5 reports the estimated effect of changes in town-level 
median income on changes in housing prices for 49 borders in 10 southern states. In contrast to 
the main sample, changes in town-level median income are not associated with housing price 
appreciation in the South. Taken together, these patterns suggest that the main estimates are not 
being  driven  by  confounding  differences  in  zoning  regulations  or  household  sorting  across 
borders. 
 
V. The Role of Public Goods in the Demand for High-Income Municipalities 
Unlike the desire to live in a wealthy neighborhood, which can be driven by local social 
interactions, the desire to live in a wealthy town relies on civic interactions mediated either by 
the electoral process, the fiscal system or the public schools. This section considers a series of 
local policies that may account for the estimated demand for wealthy co-residents. 
I begin in Table 6 by assessing whether rich and poor towns offer different bundles of tax 
rates and local public goods. In particular, following the structure of equation 1, I regress a series 
of  local  policy  variables  on  town-level  median  income  and  a  vector  of  border  area  dummy 
variables in 1970. I focus on this cross-section because 1970 is the only year in which data on 
effective property tax rates were collected. I find that high-income towns differ from their poorer 
neighbors in three ways: first, they set lower property tax rates. An additional $10,000 of town-
level  median  income  is  associated  with  a  0.52  percentage  point  reduction  in  the  effective      
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property  tax  rate.  Secondly,  wealthy  municipalities  spend  less  than  poor  cities  on  non-
educational  functions,  particularly  on  public  safety,  perhaps  because  they  face  fewer  social 
problems. Finally, a larger share of residents in high-income towns hold a college degree, a 
potential proxy for higher peer quality in local public schools. However, wealthy towns do not 
allocate more funds to educational expenditures per pupil overall; nor do they spend more on fire 
protection, parks, road maintenance or sanitation services by town income (not shown).
22 
Table 7 then considers whether differences in local policy can account for the estimated 
willingness to pay to live in a high-income town. The first panel of Table 7 begins by exploring 
the relationship between housing values and each local policy variable in turn. Home values fall 
by 6.5 percent for every point increase in the property tax rate. By this measure, a homeowner 
would break even after eight years by purchasing a more expensive home in a jurisdiction with a 
lower tax rate. A higher college share in the town is associated with higher home values at the 
border, lending credence to the notion that the college share of the population is a proxy for 
higher quality in public schools. Perhaps surprisingly, home values decline with total municipal 
expenditures or additional spending on public safety. These estimates may reflect the fact that 
these  expenditures  are  disproportionately  directed  toward  needy  neighborhoods,  rather  than 
toward  border  areas;  residents  at  the  border  prefer  not  to  pay  to  police  someone  else’s 
neighborhoods.  
The second panel of Table 7 adds each of these local policies to the regression of home 
values on median income. Policies that explain a portion of the willingness to pay for wealthy 
co-residents should reduce the coefficient on median income. For comparison, the first column 
                                                 
22 It is important to note that higher expenditures may not translate into a higher quality or quantity of public 
services. First, the majority of expenditures cover the wages and salaries of municipal workers, an increase in which 
may not translate into a higher quality of service provision. Second, municipal services are not equally provided to 
every neighborhood but may be directed at either low- or high-income areas.      
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re-estimates equation 1 for the 61 borders with available data on all local policy measures in 
1970. The resulting coefficient (0.260) implies that $10,000 increase in median income raises 
housing values by 5.2 percent in this subsample. Including the property tax rate as an additional 
regressor reduces the coefficient of interest to 0.18. The coefficient also falls when the town’s 
share  of  college  graduates  is  added.  When  both  the  property  tax  rate  and  college  share  are 
included, the coefficient on median income falls to 0.13 and is no longer statistically significant. 
I conclude that higher school quality and lower property tax rates can account for 20 percent and 
30 percent of the estimated demand for living in a wealthy town, respectively. Neither the level 
of total non-educational spending nor spending earmarked for public safety help to explain the 
demand for high-income towns. I conclude that the desire to live in a wealthy town stems from 
two main (measurable) factors: lower property tax rates set by jurisdictions with a higher tax 
base,  and  higher  school  quality  in  wealthier  districts,  as  proxied  by  a  higher  college  share, 
despite equal expenditures per pupil.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
This paper estimates the demand for living in a high-income town by examining changes 
in the premium for suburban housing as the city-suburban income gap widens (or narrows) over 
time. I focus on the willingness to pay for the civic features of wealthy towns, above and beyond 
the value of rich neighbors, by comparing changes over time in the price of neighboring housing 
units on opposite sides of city-suburban borders. Local public goods and tax rates change sharply 
at these borders, while the pace of change in housing and neighborhood quality evolve more 
continuously over space.       
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I find that the marginal homeowner is willing to pay seven percent more for an otherwise 
equal housing unit located in a town whose median income was $10,000 above the neighboring 
city. Half of this premium can be explained by the fact that jurisdictions with a higher tax base 
set lower property tax rates and offer higher school quality. The total demand for living in a 
high-income suburb is driven both by local political economy and neighborhood quality. Bayer, 
Ferreira  and  McMillan  (2007)  document  that  housing  values  increase  by  six  percent  for  a 
$10,000 increase in the income of immediate neighbors. Overall, it appears that the marginal 
homebuyer is willing to pay up to 13 percent more for an equivalent house located in a high-
income town surrounded by high-income neighbors. 
The  demand  for  wealthy  co-residents  can,  in  theory,  act  as  a  “suburban  multiplier,” 
augmenting the response to other urban shocks. For example, the construction of the interstate 
highway system was a major cause of suburbanization during this period (Baum-Snow, 2007). If 
the presence of a new highway encouraged households in the top half of the income distribution 
to leave the city, the resulting change in average household income would further reduce demand 
for  city  residence.  A  feedback  effect  of  this  nature  may  help  explain  the  rapid  decline  of 
American central cities in the 1960s and 1970s (Baumol, 1967). More speculatively, this type of 
multiplier may be at work in the opposite direction today as some cities undergo a process of 
gentrification. In this case, rising incomes spurred by the return to the city of educated young 
workers and wealthy empty-nesters could form the basis of an urban revival.      
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Figure 1: Housing values and unit size by distance to the jurisdiction border, Poorer vs. 
richer towns. Pooled cross-section, 1960-80 
 




















b. Average number of rooms per owner-occupied housing unit 
 
















Notes: Each dot is a coefficients from a version of equation 1 that replaces the town-level median income with a 
vector of dummy variables for block tiers, coded by distance from the municipal border. I classify the jurisdictions 
in each border area as either “rich” or “poor.” Tier numbers range between 6 and -6 with positive numbers falling on 
the rich side of the border and higher numbers (in absolute value) indicating distances further from the border. 
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Figure 2: Changes in housing values and unit size by distance to the jurisdiction border, 
Towns with faster vs. slower income growth. Panel, 1960-80 
 
a.  Changes in housing values 
 



































Notes: Each dot is a coefficient on interactions from a version of equation 2 that replaces the town-level median 
income with dummy variables for block tiers and interactions between block tiers and Census year. I classify the 
jurisdictions in each border area as either experiencing higher or lower income growth in relative terms over a 
decade. Tier numbers range between 6 and -6 with positive numbers falling on side of the border with higher income 
growth and higher numbers (in absolute value) indicating distances further from the border. Estimates are relative to 
the first block tier on the poor side. Dotted lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between changes in the city-suburban income gap and changes in 
housing unit size at city-suburban borders, 1970-80 
 
a. Housing values 
 
 



















b. Average number of rooms per owner-occupied housing unit 
 






















Notes: Each dot represents a border area. The X-axis indicates a change in the log income gap between a suburb and 
its city from 1970 to 1980. The Y-axis depicts changes in the suburban housing premium (panel A) or the suburban 
unit size premium (panel B) over the decade. 
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Table 1: Jurisdiction borders with available block-level data by metropolitan area, 1960-80 
 
    Number of borders 









           
North  Allentown-Bethlehem, PA    2  2   
  Boston, MA  2  1  3  4 
  Hartford, CT    3  3  2 
  New York, NY-NJ
†  10    10  3 
  Pittsburgh, PA  3    3   
  Providence, RI  3  1  4   
  Scranton, PA    1  1   
  Springfield, MA    1  1  1 
Midwest  Akron, OH    2  2  2 
  Canton, OH    1  1   
  Chicago, IL
†  5  2  7  6 
  Cleveland, OH  2    2   
  Dayton, OH  1    1   
  Des Moines, IA    2  2   
  Detroit, MI  1  6  7   
  Grand Rapids, MI    4  4   
  Indianapolis, IN    1  1  3 
  Kansas City, KS-MO  2  2  4  3 
  Madison, WI    1  1   
  Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN  1  1  2  3 
  Moline-Davenport, IL-IA  1  1  2   
  South Bend, IN    1  1   
  St. Louis, MO  1    1  4 
West  Denver, CO  1  2  3   
  Las Vegas, NV    1  1   
  Los Angeles, CA
†  17  5  22  7 
  Phoenix, AZ    1  1  1 
  Portland, OR    2  2  1 
  San Bernard.-Riverside, 
CA 
  1  1  3 
  San Francisco, CA
†  2  1  3   
  San Jose, CA   4    4   
  TOTAL:  56  46  102  44 
Notes:  Metropolitan  areas  marked  with 
†  contained  secondary  central  cities  in  1960  that  are  now 
considered  by  the  Census  Bureau  to  anchor  their  own,  independent  metropolitan  areas.  These  are: 
Newark, NJ; Jersey City, NJ; and Clifton, NJ (New York); Gary, IN (Chicago); Anaheim, CA (Los 
Angeles); and Oakland, CA (San Francisco). 
      




Table 2: Effect of jurisdiction-level median income on housing quality  
and neighborhood demographics 
 
 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 (columns 3 and 4) report coefficients and standard errors from separate regressions of 
equation 1 (equation 2) with each block-level characteristic as the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered 
by border area. There are 102 border areas included in the regressions (see Table 1). Observations are weighted by 
the number of owner-occupied units on the block. Columns marked “tract” contain blocks in the first six tiers on 
either side of the border, while columns marked “block” contain only blocks adjacent to the border. The sample is 
restricted to blocks with at least five owner-occupied units without missing information on housing values.  
  Cross-section  Panel 
     
Dependent variable  Tract  Block  Tract  Block 
Share single family   0.070   0.034  -0.135  -0.183 
   (0.035)   (0.050)   (0.079)   (0.141) 
         
Number units  -13.073  -14.227  4.971  9.029 
   (10.059)   (21.352)  (23.912)  (47.062) 
         
Number rooms   0.765   0.779   0.009   0.344 
   (0.160)   (0.199)   (0.307)   (0.439) 
         
Share black          -0.086          -0.036          -0.354       -0.164 
  (0.047)  (0.022)  (0.233)  (0.147) 
         
N  20,336  6,358  20,336  6,358      




Table 3: Effect of jurisdiction-level income on housing prices 
 
Dependent variable = ln(value of owner-occupied units) 
  Cross section  Panel 
     
  Tract  Block  Block, 
controls 
Tract  Block  Block, 
controls 
Panel A             
ln(median income)  0.425  0.348  0.197  0.552  0.480  0.371 
  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.036)  (0.190)  (0.170)  (0.127) 
             
N  20,348  6,358  6,358  20,348  6,358  6,358 
             
Panel B             
Share poverty  -1.428  -1.045  -0.694  -0.922  -0.948  -0.671 
   (0.277)   (0.237)   (0.170)   (0.624)   (0.550)   (0.460) 
             
N  16,144  4,844  4,844  16,144  4,844  4,844 
Notes: Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from regressions of housing prices on jurisdiction-level income 
measures (cross-section = equation 1; panel = equation 2). Standard errors are clustered by border area. The median 
income regressions contain data from 1960 to 1980, while poverty rates are only available in 1970 and 1980. Block-
level control variables include: number of housing units on block; share of units that are single-family structures; 
average number of rooms; and black population share. See the notes to Table 2 for other details on the samples and 
specifications.      




Table 4: Effect of jurisdiction-level median income on housing prices,  
Alternative specifications 
 
Dependent variable = ln(value of owner occupied units) 
  1960-80 
1. Baseline  0.480 
N = 6,358  (0.170) 
   
2. Unweighted  0.491 
  (0.171) 
   
3. Weight borders equally  0.516 
  (0.162) 
   
4. Balanced panel  0.518 
N = 4,417  (0.219) 
   
5. Drop California  0.697 
N = 3,850  (0.182) 
   
6. Drop if desegregate  0.509 
N = 2,911  (0.210) 
   
7. Dependent variable = ln(rent)  0.308 
N = 4,487   (0.192) 
   
8. Dependent variable = ln(user cost)  0.831 
N = 7,804   (0.264) 
   
9. Add jurisdiction controls  0.545 
  (0.142) 
Notes: Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from panel regressions of housing prices on jurisdiction-level 
median income (equation 2). See the notes to Tables 2 and 3 for details on the sample and specification. The 
regressions underlying rows 4-6 contain 56, 79 and 49 border areas respectively. Row 7 (row 8) includes all blocks 
with at least five rental (occupied) units and is weighted by the number of rental (occupied) units. Row 9 includes as 
regressors the black population share and share of the population over 65 years old at the town-level.  
      




Table 5: Effect of jurisdiction-level median income on housing prices in various subsamples 
 
Dependent variable = ln(value of owner-occupied units) 
  1970-80 
1. Baseline  0.431 
N = 4,854  (0.189) 
   
Sub-samples   
2. < 75
th percentile, % black  0.521 
N = 3,593  (0.255) 
   
3. < median, initial price gap  0.464 
N = 2,455  (0.176) 
   
4. < median, initial single family gap  0.452 
N = 2,537  (0.287) 
   
Southern sample (Borders = 49) 
5. Southern  0.019 
N = 2,329  (0.062) 
Notes: Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from panel regressions of housing prices on jurisdiction-level 
median income (equation 2). See the notes to Tables 2 and 3 for details on the sample and specification. In order to 
calculate  initial  characteristics  for  each  border  area,  analysis  is  restricted  to  1970  and  1980.  In  1970,  the  75
th 
percentile of initial black population share is 3.6 percent; the median initial housing price gap is 12.5 percent and the 
initial gap in single family share is 9.5 percentage points. 
      




Table 6: Association between jurisdiction-level median income and local policy, 1970 
 
  Dependent variables 
   
  Property  Share  Spending ($1000 per cap.)  Spending ($1000 per pupil) 
RHS variable  tax rate  college  Total  Police    Instruct  Admin. 
ln(med income)  -2.681  0.276  -1.374   -0.214  -0.169  -0.047 
   (0.325)   (0.032)   (0.235)    (0.025)   (0.385)   (0.045) 
             
Borders  62  102  96  96  102  102 
Observations  124  204  192  192  204  204 
Notes: Cells contain coefficients and standard errors from regressions of local policy measures on jurisdiction-level 
median income. The unit of observation is a jurisdiction. Following the format of equation 1, the regressions also 
contain a vector of border area dummy variables. Sources for the local policy measures are reported in Appendix 
Table 1.      




Table 7: Explaining the willingness to pay for jurisdiction-level income with variation in 
local policy, 1970 
 
Dependent variable = ln(value of owner-occupied units) 





$1,000 per cap. 
Tax +  
sh. college 
        Total  Police   
Panel A             
Policy variable  ---  -0.065  0.428  -0.037  -0.621  --- 
     (0.015)   (0.202)   (0.025)   (0.196)   
             
Panel B             
ln(med income)  0.260  0.181  0.232  0.292  0.221  0.127 
  (0.061)  (0.094)  (0.057)  (0.062)  (0.072)  (0.107) 
             
Policy variable  ---  -0.028  0.113  0.024  -0.167  --- 
     (0.022)   (0.161)   (0.017)   (0.239)   
Notes:  Cells  contain  coefficients  and  standard  errors  from  cross-sectional  regressions  of  housing  prices  on 
jurisdiction-level income measures (equation 1). Standard errors are clustered by border area. The sample includes 
the 61 borders with information on all local policy variables in 1970 (N = 1,631). In the first column, median 
income is the only jurisdiction-level regressor. The remaining columns adds local policy variables. Sources for the 
local policy measures are reported in Appendix Table 1. See the notes to Tables 2 and 3 for more details on the 
sample and the specification.      




Appendix Table 1: Sources for jurisdiction-level public goods data 
 
Variable  Source 
Current (non-educational) expenditure
1     Census of Governments, 1972 
•  Categories: Fire, parks, police, roads, 
sanitation, sewers, other 
  
  
Educational expenditure, per pupil
2     Elementary and Secondary General 
•  Categories: Instructional, administrative    Information System (ELSEGIS), 1968-69 
        
Effective property tax rates
3     Census of Governments, 1972 
   
Share residents with college degree     Census of Population, 1970 
1: Non-educational expenditures are measured at the municipal level. 
 In some states, counties are responsible for 
providing public services. Most jurisdiction pairs in the sample belong to the same county. 
 
2: Educational spending per pupil is collected both from independent school districts and municipal school systems.  
 
3: The Census of Government estimates effective property rates at the town level from samples of recent home sales. 
The effective property tax rate of a housing unit is the ratio of the property tax bill to the transaction price. These 
rates are reported for the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentile of the market value distribution. I assign units on the poor 
(wealthy) side of borders the effective rate for homes at the 75
th (25
th) percentile of the value distribution in their 
jurisdiction. That is, I assume that the houses on the border are larger than the typical city unit and smaller than the 
typical suburban unit. Exact data on property tax rates are available for 38 city-suburban borders. For 27 additional 
borders, I assign the suburb the property tax rate reported for the “balance of the metropolitan area” (that is, for all 
home sales in the suburban ring). In the remaining 37 cases, there is no information on property tax rates for any 
towns on the suburban side of the border. 
        




Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics, Jurisdiction variables 
 










Median family income  $49,980    $9,926  $2,880 
($ 2000)  ($10,227)  ($8,918)  ($2,181) 
       
Poverty rate  0.067  0.046  0.026 
  (0.036)   (0.031)  (0.025) 
       
Share black  0.086  0.151  0.055 
  (0.142)  (0.145)  (0.068) 
       
Share college graduate  0.123  0.068  0.027 
  (0.081)  (0.071)  (0.030) 
       
Property tax rate, % of   2.535  0.723   
sale price  (1.115)  (0.482)   
       
In $1,000 ($2000):       
Instruction $ per pupil  3.001  0.512   
  (0.652)  (0.473)   
       
Non-education $ per capita  0.736  0.493   
  (0.424)  (0.431)   
       
Police $ per capita  0.114  0.066   
   (0.053)  (0.045)   
Notes:  Demographic  and  socio-economic  variables  are  available  for  102  city-suburban  borders.  Expenditure 
variables are available for 97 borders and property tax rates for 65 borders.      




Appendix Table 3: Summary statistics, Block-level variables 
 
  1960  1970  1980 
Average value, owned  $101,681  $102,651  $157,690 
  (53,358)  (41,524)  (91,863) 
       
Number units  42.689  39.347  41.954 
  (43.783)  (39.122)  (58.118) 
       
Mean # rooms, owned  5.713  5.736  5.478 
  (0.933)  (1.083)  (1.022) 
       
Share single family  0.735  0.796  0.839 
  (0.227)  (0.265)  (0.229) 
       
Share black on block  0.027  0.064  0.124 
  (0.112)  (0.201)  (0.287) 
       
Average contract rent  $457.90  $519.13  $575.80 
  (143.23)  (169.23)  (183.77) 
Notes: Cells contain means and standard deviations of block-level variables. Means are reported for the sub-sample 
of blocks that have at least five owner-occupied units and that are not missing information on housing values. The 
one exception is average contract rent, which is reported for the sub-sample of blocks with at least five rental units. 
 